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Abstract
We introduce the problem of releasing sensitive data under differential privacy when the
privacy level is subject to change over time. Existing work assumes that privacy level is de-
termined by the system designer as a fixed value before sensitive data is released. For certain
applications, however, users may wish to relax the privacy level for subsequent releases of the
same data after either a re-evaluation of the privacy concerns or the need for better accuracy.
Specifically, given a database containing sensitive data, we assume that a response y1 that pre-
serves 1-differential privacy has already been published. Then, the privacy level is relaxed to
2, with 2 > 1, and we wish to publish a more accurate response y2 while the joint response
(y1, y2) preserves 2-differential privacy. How much accuracy is lost in the scenario of gradu-
ally releasing two responses y1 and y2 compared to the scenario of releasing a single response
that is 2-differentially private? Our results show that there exists a composite mechanism that
achieves no loss in accuracy.
We consider the case in which the private data lies within Rn with an adjacency relation
induced by the `1-norm, and we focus on mechanisms that approximate identity queries. We
show that the same accuracy can be achieved in the case of gradual release through a mechanism
whose outputs can be described by a lazy Markov stochastic process. This stochastic process
has a closed form expression and can be efficiently sampled. Our results are applicable beyond
identity queries. To this end, we demonstrate that our results can be applied in several cases,
including Google’s RAPPOR project, trading of sensitive data, and controlled transmission of
private data in a social network. Finally, we conjecture that gradual release of data without
performance loss is an intrinsic property of differential privacy and, thus, holds in more general
settings.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy is a framework that provides rigorous privacy guarantees for the release of
sensitive data. The intrinsic trade-off between the privacy guarantees and accuracy of the privacy-
preserving mechanism is controlled by the privacy level  ∈ [0,∞); smaller values of  imply
stronger privacy and less accuracy. Specifically, end users, who are interested in the output of the
mechanism, demand acceptable accuracy of the privacy-preserving mechanism, whereas, owners of
sensitive data are interested in strong enough privacy guarantees.
Existing work on differential privacy assumes that the privacy level is determined prior to
release of any data and remains constant throughout the life of the privacy-preserving mechanism.
However, for certain applications, the privacy level may need to be revised after data has been
released, due to either users’ need for improved accuracy or after owners’ re-evaluation of the
privacy concerns. One such application is trading of private data, where the owners re-evaluate their
privacy concerns after monetary payments. Specifically, the end users initially access private data
under 1 privacy guarantees and they later decide to “buy” more accurate data, relax privacy level
to 2, and enjoy better accuracy. Furthermore, the need for more accurate responses may dictate
a change in the privacy level. In particular, a database containing sensitive data is persistent over
time; e.g. a database of health records contains the same patients with the same health history over
several years. Future uses of the database may require better accuracy, especially, after a threat
is suspected (e.g. virus spread, security breach). These two example applications share the same
core questions.
Is it possible to release a preliminary response with 1-privacy guarantees and, later, release a
more accurate and less private response with overall 2-privacy guarantees? How is this scenario
compared to publishing a single response under 2-privacy guarantees? In fact, is the performance
of the second response damaged by the preliminary one?
Composition theorems [1] provide a simple, but suboptimal, solution to gradually releasing
sensitive data. Given an initial privacy level 1, a noisy, privacy-preserving response y1 is generated.
Later, the privacy level is increased to a new value 2 and a new response y2 is published. For an
overall privacy level of 2, the second response y2 needs to be (2 − 1)-private, according to the
composition theorem. Therefore, the accuracy of the second response deteriorates because of the
initial release y1.
In this work, we derive a composite mechanism which exhibits no loss in accuracy after the
privacy level is relaxed. This mechanism employs correlation between successive responses, and, to
the best of our knowledge, is the first mechanism that performs gradual release of sensitive data.
1.1 Our Results
This work introduces the problem of gradually releasing sensitive data. Our results focus on the
case of vector-valued sensitive data u ∈ Rn with an `1-norm adjacency relation. Our first result
states that, for the one-dimensional (n = 1) identity query, there is an algorithm which relaxes
privacy in two steps without sacrificing any accuracy. Although our technical treatment focuses on
identical queries, our results are applicable to a broader family of queries. We also prove the Markov
property for this algorithm and, thus, we can easily (without any computational complexity) relax
privacy in any number of steps. These two results provide a different perspective of differential
privacy, and lead to the definition of a lazy Markov stochastic process indexed by the privacy level
. Gradually releasing sensitive data is performed by sampling once from this stochastic process.
We also extend the results to the high-dimensional case.
On a theoretical level, our contributions add a whole new dimension to differential privacy —
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that of a varying parameter . We focus on the mechanism that adds Laplace-distributed noise V
to the private data u ∈ Rn:
Qu = u+
v
(1)

...
v
(n)

 , (1)
where  is the privacy level, ‖ · ‖1 is the `1-norm, and {v(i) }ni=1 are independent and identically
distributed samples from the stochastic process {V}>0 which has the following properties:
1. {V}>0 is Markov: V1⊥V3 |V2 , for any 3 ≥ 2 ≥ 1 > 0.
2. V is Laplace-distributed: P(V = x) = 2e
−|x|.
3. {V}>0 is lazy, i.e. there is positive probability of not changing value):
P(V1 = x|V2 = y) =
(
1
2
)2
δ(x− y) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)2) 1
2
e−1|x−y|, where 2 ≥ 1 > 0,
where δ is Dirac’s delta function. For a fixed , mechanism (1) reduces to the Laplace
mechanism.
Mechanism (1) has the following properties and, thus, performs gradual release of private data:
• Privacy: For any set of privacy levels {i}mi=1, the mechanism that responds with {Qiu}mi=1
is (maxmi=1 i)-private.
• Accuracy: For a fixed , the mechanism Q is the optimal -private mechanism.
In practice, gradual release of private data is achieved by sampling the stochastic process {V}>0:
1. Draw a single sample {v}>0 from the stochastic process {V}>0.
2. Compute the signal y = u+ v,  > 0.
3. For 1-privacy guarantees, release the random variable y1 .
4. Once privacy level is relaxed from 1 to 2, where 2 ≥ 1, release the random variable y2 .
5. In order to relax privacy level in an arbitrarily many times, 1 → 2 → · · · → m, repeat the
last step.
More formally, our main result derives a composite mechanism that gradually releases private
data by relaxing the privacy level in an arbitrary number of steps.
Theorem 1 (A. Gradual Privacy as a Composite Mechanism). Let Rn be the space of privacy
data equipped with an `1-norm adjacency relation. Consider m privacy levels {i}mi=1 such that
0 ≤ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ m which successively relax the privacy level. Then, there exists a composite
mechanism Q of the form
Qu := (u+ V1, . . . , u+ Vm) , (2)
such that:
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Figure 1: Gradual release of identity queries is achieved with the use of the stochastic process V for  ≥ 0.
For tight values of privacy ( → 0), high values of noise (∣∣tan−1 V∣∣ → pi2 ) are returned, whereas, almost
zero samples (V → 0) are returned for large privacy budgets (→∞). The process V is Markov; future
samples depend only on the current value of the process which eases implementation. Furthermore, the
process is lazy; the value of the process changes only a few times.
1. The restriction of the mechanism Q to the first j coordinates (u+V1, . . . , u+Vj) is j-private,
for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
2. Each coordinate j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of the mechanism u + Vj achieves the optimal mean-squared
error E‖Vj‖22.
The mechanism that satisfies Theorem 1 has a closed-form expression and provides a new
perspective of differential privacy. Instead of designing composite mechanisms of the form (2), we
consider the continuum of privacy levels  ∈ [0,∞). Our results are more succinctly stated in terms
of a stochastic process {V}>0. A composite mechanism is recovered from the stochastic process
by sampling the process {V}>0 at a finite set of privacy levels {i}mi=1.
Theorem 1 (B. Gradual Privacy as a Stochastic Process). Let Rn be the space of privacy data
equipped with the `1-norm. Then, there exists a stochastic process {V}>0} that defines the family
of mechanisms Q parametrized by :
Qu := u+ V,  ∈ (0,∞), (3)
such that:
• Privacy: For any  > 0, the mechanism that releases the signal {u+ Vσ}σ∈(0,] is -private.
• Accuracy: The mechanism Q that releases the random variable u + V is the optimal -
private mechanism, i.e. the noise sample V achieves the optimal mean-squared error E‖V‖22.
From a more practical point of view, our results are applicable to cases beyond identity queries.
Specifically, our results are directly applicable to a broad family of privacy-preserving mechanisms
that are built upon the Laplace mechanism and, informally, have the following form. The sensitive
data is initially preprocessed, then, the Laplace mechanism is invoked, and, finally, a post-processing
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step occurs. Under the assumption that the preprocessing step is invariant of the privacy level,
gradual release of sensitive data is possible. We demonstrate the applicability of our results on
Google’s RAPPOR project [2], which analyzes software features that individuals use while respect-
ing their privacy. In particular, if a software feature is suspected to be malicious, privacy level
can be gradually relaxed and a more accurate analysis can be performed. On another direction,
our results broaden the spectrum of applications of differential privacy. To this end, we present
an application to social networks where users have different privacy concerns against close friends,
acquaintances, and strangers.
We conclude our paper with a conjecture. Although present work focuses on mechanisms that
add Laplace-distributed noise, we conjecture that the feasibility of gradually releasing sensitive
data is a more general property of differential privacy. In particular, we formulate the conjecture
that repeatedly relaxing the privacy level without loss of accuracy is possible for a larger family of
privacy-aware mechanisms.
1.2 Previous Work
Differential privacy is an active field of research and a rich spectrum of differential private mech-
anisms has appeared in the literature. The exponential mechanism [1] is a powerful and generic
tool for building differential private mechanisms. In particular, mechanisms that efficiently approx-
imate linear (counting) queries have received a lot of attention [3], [4], [5]. Besides counting queries,
privacy-aware versions of more complex quantities have been introduced such as signal filtering [6],
optimization problems [7], [8], and allocation problems [9]. In addition to the theoretical work,
differential privacy has been deployed in software tools [10].
The aforementioned work assumes that the privacy level  is a designer’s choice that is held fixed
throughout the life of the privacy-aware mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first approach that considers privacy-aware mechanisms with a varying privacy level . Gradually
releasing private data resembles the setting of differential privacy under continuous observation,
which was first studied in [11]. In that setting of [11], the privacy level remains fixed while more
sensitive data is being added to the database and more responses are released. In contrast, our
setting assumes that both the sensitive data and the quantity of interest are fixed and the privacy
level  is varying.
Gradual release of sensitive data is closely related to optimality results. Work in [3] established
optimality results in an asymptotic sense (with the size of the database). Instead, our work requires
exact optimality results and, therefore, is presented within a tighter version of differential privacy
that was explored in [12], [13], where exact optimality results exist. This tighter notion which is
targeted for metric spaces and we call Lipschitz privacy, allows for the use of optimization techniques
and calculus tools. Prior work on Lipschitz privacy includes the exact optimality of the Laplace
mechanism is established under Lipschitz privacy [13], [14].
On a more technical level, most prior work on differential privacy [7], [8], [9] introduces differen-
tial private mechanisms that are built upon the Laplace mechanism and variations of it. Although
building upon the Laplace mechanism limits the solution space, there is a good reason for doing so.
Specifically, for non-trivial applications, the space of probability measures can be extremely rich
and hard to deal with. Technically, our approach deviates from prior work by searching over the
whole space of differential private mechanisms. Work in [15] is another example that proposes a
non-Laplace distribution in order to achieve better performance on subsequent queries while satis-
fying overall differential privacy constraints. The Laplace mechanism, then, naturally emerges as
the optimal mechanism.
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2 Background Information
2.1 Differential Privacy
The framework of differential privacy [16], [17] dictates that, whenever sensitive data is accessed, a
noisy response is returned. The statistics of the injected noise are deliberately designed to ensure
two things. First, an adversary that observes the noisy response cannot confidently infer the original
sensitive data. The privacy level is parametrized by  ∈ [0,∞), where smaller values of  imply
stronger privacy guarantees. Second, the noisy response can still be used as a surrogate of the exact
response without severe performance degradation. On the other hand, the accuracy of the noisy
response is quantified by the mean-squared error from the exact response.
Work in [16] defined differential privacy, which provides strong privacy guarantees against a
powerful adversary.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). Let U be a set of private data, A ⊆ U2 be a symmetric binary
relation (called adjacency relation) and Y be a set of possible responses. For  > 0, the randomized
mapping Q : U → ∆ (Y) (called mechanism) is -differentially private if
P(Qu ∈ S) ≤ eP(Qu′ ∈ S), ∀(u, u′) ∈ A, ∀S ⊆ Y. (4)
Remark 1. We assume the existence of a rich-enough σ-algebra M ⊆ 2Y on the set of possible
responses Y. Then, ∆ (Y) denotes the set of probability measures over (M,Y).
Let y ∼ Qu be a noisy response produced by the -differentially private mechanism Q. For
brevity, we say that “output y preserves -privacy of the input u”.
The adjacency relation A captures the aspects of the private data u that are deemed sensitive.
Consider a scheme with n users, where each user i contributes her real-valued private data ui ∈ R,
and a private database u = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Rn is composed. For α > 0, an adjacency relation that
captures the participation of a single individual to the aggregating scheme is defined as:
(u, u′) ∈ A`0 ⇔ ∃j s.t. ui = u′i,∀i 6= j and |uj − u′j | ≤ α. (5)
Adjacency relation A`0 can be relaxed to A`1 , which is induced by the `1-norm and is defined as:
(u, u′) ∈ A`1 ⇔ ‖u− u‖1 ≤ α, (6)
where it holds that A`0 ⊆ A`1 .
Resilience to post-processing establishes that any post-processing on the output of an -differentially
private mechanism cannot hurt the privacy guarantees.
Proposition 3 (Resilience to Post-Processing). Let Q : U → ∆ (Y) be an -differentially private
mechanism and g : Y → Z be a possibly randomized function. Then, the mechanism g ◦ Q is also
-differentially private.
More complicated mechanisms can be defined from simple ones using the composition theorem.
Proposition 4 (Composition). Let mechanisms Q1, Q2 : U → ∆ (Y) respectively satisfy 1 and
2-differential privacy. Then, the composite mechanism Q : U → ∆
(Y2) defined by Q = (Q1, Q2)
is (1 + 2)-differentially private.
Proposition 4 provides privacy guarantees whenever the same sensitive data is repeatedly used.
Moreover, the resulting privacy level 1 + 2 given by Proposition 4 is an upper bound and can
severely over-estimate the actual privacy level. The mechanism presented in this paper introduces
correlation between mechanisms Q1 and Q2, so that it provides much stronger privacy guarantees.
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2.2 Lipschitz Privacy
Lipschitz privacy [12], [13] is a slightly stronger version of differential privacy and is often used
when the data is defined on metric spaces.
Definition 5 (Lipschitz Privacy). Let (U , d) be a metric space and Y be the set of possible responses.
For  > 0, the mechanism Q is -Lipschitz private if the following Lipschitz condition holds:
|lnP(Qu ∈ S)− lnP(Qu ∈ S)| ≤ d(u, u′), ∀u, u′ ∈ U , ∀S ⊆ Y. (7)
Lipschitz privacy is closely related to the original definition of differential privacy, where the
adjacency relation A in differential privacy is defined through the metric d. In fact, any Lipschitz
private mechanism is also differentially private.
Proposition 6. For any α > 0, an -Lipschitz private mechanism Q is α-differentially private
under the adjacency relation A:
(u, u′) ∈ A ⇔ d(u, u′) ≤ α. (8)
Adjacency relation A`1 defined in (6) can be captured by the `1-norm under the notion of
Lipschitz privacy; the metric d is d(u, u′) = ‖u− u′‖1.
Our results are stated within the Lipschitz privacy framework. Proposition 6 implies that our
privacy results remain valid within the framework of differential privacy. For brevity, we call an
-Lipschitz private mechanism as -private and imply that a differentially private mechanism can
be derived.
Similar to differential privacy, Lipschitz privacy is preserved under post-processing (Proposi-
tion 3) and composition of mechanisms (Proposition 4). Compared to differential privacy, Lipschitz
privacy is more convenient to work with when the data and adjacency relation are defined on a
metric space, which allows for the use of calculus tools. Under mild assumptions, the Lipschitz
constraint (7) is equivalent to a derivative bound. In particular, for U = Rn equipped with the
metric induced by the norm ‖ · ‖, a mechanism Q is -Lipschitz private if
‖∇u lnP(Qu = y)‖∗ ≤ , (9)
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖. In practice, we check condition (9) to establish the privacy
properties of mechanism Q.
2.3 Optimality of the Laplace Mechanism
Computing the optimal private mechanism for a fixed privacy level  is considered an open problem.
Specifically, let U be the space of private data, A be an adjacency relation, q : U → Y be a query,
and  be a fixed privacy level. The exponential mechanism [1] is a popular technique for constructing
private mechanisms.
Proposition 7 (Exponential Mechanism). Let s : U × Y → R be 1-Lipschitz in (U , d). Consider
the mechanism Q whose output satisfies
P(Qu = y) ∝ es(u,y). (10)
Then, Q is -Lipschitz private.
The Laplace mechanism is a special instance of the exponential mechanism for real spaces
(Rn, `1).
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Figure 2: The staircase mechanism is the optimal -differential private mechanism, whereas the Laplace
mechanism is the optimal -Lipschitz private mechanism. Therefore, the
Definition 8 (Laplace Mechanism). Let (Rn, `1) be the space of private data. The Laplace mech-
anism is defined as:
Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ e−‖V ‖1 . (11)
The Laplace mechanism can be shown to be -differentially private. In general, however, the
Laplace mechanism is suboptimal in the sense of minimum mean-squared error. For the single-
dimensional case, the staircase mechanism [18] is the optimal -differentially private mechanism;
the mechanism which adds noise V whose distribution is shown in Figure 2. However, the Laplace
mechanism is proven to be the optimal -Lipschitz private mechanism in the sense of both minimum
entropy [14] and minimum mean-squared error [13], whereas the staircase mechanism fails to satisfy
Lipschitz privacy due to its discontinuous probability density function.
Theorem 9 ([13] Optimality of Laplace). Consider the -Lipschitz private (in (Rn, `1)) mechanism
Q : Rn → ∆ (Rn) of the form Qu = u+V , with V ∼ g(V ) ∈ ∆ (Rn). Then, the Laplace mechanism
that adds noise with density ln1 (v) =
(

2
)n
e−‖v‖1 minimizes the mean-squared error. Namely, for
any density g, we have:
E‖Qu− u‖22 = E
V∼g
‖V ‖2 ≥ E
V∼ln1
‖V ‖22 =
2n
2
. (12)
The optimal private mechanism characterizes the privacy-performance trade-off and is required
for gradually releasing sensitive data. Thus, optimality of the Laplace mechanism in Theorem 9 is
a key ingredient in our results and renders the problem tractable.
3 Gradual Release of Private Data
The problem of gradually releasing private data is now formulated. Initially, we focus on a single
privacy level relaxation from to 1 to 2 and a single-dimensional space of private data U = R.
Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 present extensions to high-dimensional spaces and multiple rounds of privacy
level relaxations, respectively.
Consider two privacy levels 1 and 2 with 2 ≥ 1 > 0. We wish to design a composite
mechanism Q1→2 : U → ∆ (Y × Y) that performs gradual release of data. The first and second
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coordinates respectively refer to the initial 1-private and the subsequent 2-private responses. In
practice, given privacy levels 1 and 2 and an input u ∈ U , we sample (y1, y2) from the distribution
Q1→2u. Initially, only coordinate y1 is published satisfying 1-privacy guarantees. Once privacy
level is relaxed to 2, response y2 is released as a more accurate response of the same query on the
same private data.
An adversary that wishes to infer the private input u eventually has access to both responses y1
and y2. Therefore, the pair (y1, y2) needs to satisfy 2-privacy. On the other hand, an honest user
wishes to maximize the accuracy of the response and, therefore, she is tempted to use an estimator
yM = θ(y1, y2) and infer a more accurate response yM . In order to relieve honest users from any
computational burden, we wish the best estimator to be as the truncation:
θ(y1, y2) = y2. (13)
The composition theorem [1] provides a trivial, yet highly conservative, approach. Specifically,
compositional rules imply that, if y1 satisfies 1-privacy and (y1, y2) satisfies 2-privacy, coordinate
y2 itself should be (2 − 1)-private. In the extreme case that 2 − 1 = δ  1, response y2 alone
is expected to be δ-private and, therefore, is highly corrupted by noise. This is unacceptable, since
estimator (13) yields an even noisier response than the initial response y1. Even if honest users
are expected to compute more complex estimators than the truncation one in (13), the approach
dictated by composition theorem can still be unsatisfactory.
Specifically, consider the following two scenarios:
1. An 1-private response y1 is initially released. Once privacy level is relaxed from 1 to 2, an
supplementary response y2 is released.
2. No response is initially released. Response yˆ2 is released as soon as the privacy level is relaxed
to 2.
Then, there is no guarantee that the best estimator θ(y1, y2) in Scenario 1 will match the accuracy
of the response yˆ2 in Scenario 2. An accuracy gap between the two scenarios would severely impact
differential privacy. Specifically, the system designer needs to be strategic when choosing a privacy
level. Differently stated, a market of private data based on composition theorems would exhibit
friction.
The key idea to overcome this friction is to introduce correlation between responses y1 and y2.
In this work, we focus on Euclidean spaces U = Rn and mechanisms Qu = u+V that approximate
the identity query q(u) = u. Our main result states that a frictionless market of private data is
feasible and Scenarios 1 and 2 are equivalent. This result has multi-fold implications:
• A system designer is not required to be strategic with the choice of the privacy level. Specif-
ically, she can initially under-estimate the required privacy level with 1 and she can later
fine-tune it to 2 without hurting the accuracy of the final response.
• A privacy data market can exist and private data can be traded “by the pound”. An 1-
private response y1 can be initially purchased. Next, a supplementary payment can be made
in return for a privacy level relaxation to 2 and a refined response y2. The accuracy of the
refined response y2 is, then, unaffected by the initial transaction and is controlled only by the
final privacy level 2.
More concretely, given privacy levels 1 and 2 with 2 > 1, we wish to design a composite
mechanism Q1→2 : U → Y × Y with the following properties:
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1. The restriction of Q1→2 to the first coordinate should match the performance of the optimal
1-private mechanism Q1 . More restrictively, the first coordinate of the composite mechanism
Q1→2 should be distributed identically to the optimal 1-private mechanism Q1 :
P (Q1→2u ∈ S × Y) = P (Q1u ∈ S) , ∀u ∈ U and S ⊆ Y (14)
2. The restriction of Q1→2 to the first coordinate should be 1-private. This property is imposed
by constraint 1.
3. The restriction of Q1→2 to the second coordinate should match the performance of the
optimal 2-private mechanism Q2 . Similarly to the first coordinate, the second coordinate
of the composite mechanism Q1→2 must be distributed identically to the optimal 2-private
mechanism Q2 :
P (Q1→2u ∈ Y × S) = P (Q2u ∈ S) , ∀u ∈ U and S ⊆ Y (15)
4. Once both coordinates are published, 2-privacy should be guaranteed. According to Lipschitz
privacy, the requirement is stated as follows:
P (Q1→2u ∈ S) is 2-Lipschitz in u, for all S ⊆ Y2. (16)
Equations (14) and (15) require knowledge of the optimal -private mechanism. In general,
computing the -private mechanism that maximizes a reasonable performance criterion is still an
open problem. Theorem 9 establish the optimality of the Laplace mechanism as the optimal private
approximation of the identity query.
3.1 Single-Dimensional Case
Initially, we consider the single-dimensional case where U = R equipped with the absolute value.
Theorem 9 establish the optimal -private mechanism that is required by Equations (14) and (15):
Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ e−|V |. (17)
Mechanism (17) minimizes the mean-squared error from the identity query among all -private
mechanisms that use additive noise:
E
V∼e−|V |
(Qu− u)2 (18)
Theorem 10 establishes the existence of a composite mechanism that relaxes privacy from 1 to 2
without any loss of performance.
Theorem 10. Consider privacy levels 1 and 2 with 2 ≥ 1 > 0, and mechanisms of the form:
Q1u := u+ V1 and Q2u := u+ V2, with (V1, V2) ∼ g ∈ ∆
(
R2
)
. (19)
Then, for density l1,2 with:
l1,2(x, y) =
21
22
e−2|y|δ(x− y) + 1(
2
2 − 21)
42
e−1|x−y|−2|y|, (20)
where δ is the Dirac delta function, the following properties hold:
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1. The mechanism Q1 is 1-private.
2. The mechanism Q1 is optimal, i.e. Q1 minimizes the mean-squared error EV 21 .
3. The mechanism (Q1, Q2) is 2-private.
4. The mechanism Q2 is optimal, i.e. Q2 minimizes the mean-squared error EV 22 .
Proof. Consider the mechanism Q = (Q1, Q2) induced by the noise density (20). We prove that
this mechanism satisfies all the desired properties:
1. The first coordinate is Laplace-distributed with parameter 11 . For x ≥ 0, we get:
P(V1 = x) =
∫
R
g(x, y)dy =
21
22
e−2x +
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
∫
R
e−1|x−y|−2|y|dy
=
21
22
e−2x +
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
(∫ 0
−∞
e−1x+(1+2)ydy +
∫ x
0
e−1x−(2−1)ydy
+
∫ ∞
x
e1x−(1+2)ydy
)
=
21
22
e−2x +
1(2 − 1)
42
e−1x e(1+2)y
∣∣∣0
−∞
− 1(1 + 2)
42
e−1x e−(2−1)y
∣∣∣x
0
− 1(2 − 1)
42
e−(1+2)y
∣∣∣∞
x
=
1
2
e−1x
(21)
The case x ≤ 0 follows from the symmetry (x, y)→ (−x,−y). Therefore, the first coordinate
is 1-private and achieves optimal performance.
2. The second coordinate is Laplace-distributed with parameter 12 . We have:
P(V2 = y) =
∫
R
g(x, y)dx =
21
22
e−2|y| +
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
e−2|y|
∫
R
e−1|x−y|dx
=
21
22
e−2|y| +
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
e−2|y|
∫
R
e−1|x|dx
=
21
22
e−2|y| +
22 − 21
22
e−2|y|
=
2
2
e−2|y|
(22)
Thus, the second coordinate achieves optimal performance.
3. Lastly, we need to prove that the composite mechanism is 2-private. We handle the delta
part separately by defining D = {x : (x, x) ∈ S} for a measurable S ⊆ R2. The probability
of landing in set S is:
P(Qu ∈ S) = 
2
1
22
∫
D
e−2|x−u|dx+
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
∫∫
S
e−1|(x−u)−(y−u)|−2|y−u|dxdy (23)
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We take the derivative and use Fubini’s theorem to exchange the derivative with the integral:
d
du
P(Qu ∈ S) = 
2
1
22
∫
D
2sgn(x− u)e−2|x−u|dx
+
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
∫∫
S
2sgn(y − u)e−1|x−y|−2|y−u|dxdy ⇒∣∣∣∣ dduP(Qu ∈ S)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2122
∫
D
2e
−2|x−u|dx+
1(
2
2 − 21)
42
∫∫
S
2e
−1|(x−u)−(y−u)|−2|y−u|dxdy ⇒∣∣∣∣ dduP(Qu ∈ S)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2P(Qu ∈ S)⇒ ∣∣∣∣ ddu lnP(Qu ∈ S)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
(24)
This completes the proof.
3.1.1 Single Round of Privacy Relaxation
Theorem 10 achieves gradual release of sensitive data in two steps, first with 1-privacy and, then,
with 2-privacy. In practice, Theorem 10 can be used as follows:
• Given the private value u ∈ R, sample noise V1 ∼ e−1|V1| and release response y1 = u + V1,
which is optimal and respects 1-privacy.
• Once privacy level is relaxed from 1 to 2, sample noise V2 from the conditioned on V1
distribution:
P(V2 = y|V1 = x) = 1
2
e−(2−1)|x|δ(y − x) + 
2
2 − 21
22
e−1|y−x|−2|y|+1|x|, (25)
and release response y2 = u+V2. Distribution (25) is derived from the joint distribution (20)
and ensures both that (y1, y2) is 2-private and that V2 is optimally distributed.
Conditional distribution (25) is shown in Figure 3. Note that for 2 = 1, Distribution (25) is
reduced to a delta function:
P(V2 = y|V1 = x) = δ(x− y). (26)
In words, for 2 = 1 no privacy relaxation effectively happens and, thus, no updated response
is practically released. Moreover, for 2 → ∞, a limiting argument shows that Distribution 25 is
reduced to:
P(V2 = y|V1 = x) = δ(y). (27)
Practically, letting 2 → ∞ cancel any privacy constraints and the exact value of private data u
can be released y2 = u. For general values of 1 and 2, Pearson’s correlation coefficient decreases
for more aggressive privacy relations, ρV1,V2 =
1
2
. Algorithm 1 provides a simple and efficient way
to sample V2 given V1.
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Figure 3: Gradual release of private data is performed in the following way. First, the 1-private response
y1 = u + V1 is released, where V1 ∼ e−|V1|. Once privacy level is relaxed from 1 = 1 to 2 = 2, the
supplementary response y2 = u+ V2 is released, where V2 is distributed as shown above. The composite
mechanism that releases (y1, y2) is 2-private and V2 is optimally distributed.
Algorithm 1 Sampling from Distribution (25) for the second noise sample V2 = y given the first
noise sample V1 = x can be efficiently performed.
Require: Privacy levels 1 and 2, such that 2 > 1 > 0, and noise sample x.
function RelaxPrivacy(x, 1, 2)
switch randomly
case with probability 12 e
−(2−1)|x|:
return y = x.
case with probability 2−122 :
draw z ∼
{
e(1+2)z, for z ≤ 0
0, otherwise.
return y = sgn(x)z.
case with probability 1+222
(
1− e−(2−1)|x|):
draw z ∼
{
e−(2−1)z, for 0 ≤ z ≤ |x|
0, otherwise.
y = sgn(x)z.
case with probability 2−122 e
−(2−1)|x|:
draw z ∼
{
e−(1+2)z, for z ≥ |x|
0, otherwise.
return y = sgn(x)z.
end switch
end function
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3.1.2 Single Round of Privacy Tightening
Tightening the privacy level is impossible, since it implies revoking already released data. Nonethe-
less, generating a more private version of the same data is still useful in cases such as private data
trading. In that case, distribution (20) can be sampled in the opposite direction. Specifically, noise
V2 is initially sampled, V2 ∼ e−2|V2|, and the 2-private response y2 = u + V2 is released. Next,
private data u is traded to a different agent under the stronger 1-privacy guarantees. Noise sample
V1 is drawn from distribution
P(V1 = x|V2 = y) =
(
1
2
)2
δ(x− y) +
(
1−
(
1
2
)2) 1
2
e−1|x−y|, (28)
and the 1-private response y1 = u + V1 is released. Remarkably, response y1 can be generated
conditioning only on y2:
y2 = y1 + V2→1, (29)
where V2→1 = V1 − V2 is independent of V2, V2→1⊥V2. In words, tightening privacy under the
Laplace mechanism does not require access to the original data u and can be performed by an
agent other than the private data owner. Theorem 3 suggests that the randomized post-processing
y1 = y2 + V2→1 of the 2-private response y2 is at least 2-private. For V2→1 given by distribution
(28), this tightening of privacy level is precisely quantified, i.e. 2 → 1. Recall that our results are
tight ; no excessive accuracy is sacrificed in the process.
3.2 High-Dimensional Case
Theorem 10 can be generalized for the case that the space of private data is Euclidean Rn equipped
with the `1-norm. Theorem 9 establishes that the Laplace mechanism:
Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ e−‖V ‖1 . (30)
minimizes the mean-squared error from the identity query among all -private mechanisms that use
additive noise V ∈ Rn:
E
V∼e−‖V ‖1
‖Qu− u‖22. (31)
Theorem 9 shows that each coordinate of V is independently sampled. This observation implies
that Theorem 10 can be applied to n dimensions independently.
Theorem 11. Consider privacy levels 1, 2 with 2 > 1 > 0. Let Q1 be an 1-private mechanism
and Q2 an 2-private mechanism of the form:
Q1u := u+ V1 and Q2u := u+ V2 with (V1, V2) ∼ g ∈ ∆
(
R2n
)
, (32)
where u ∈ Rnl1 Then, gradual release of sensitive data u from 1 to 2 is achieved by the probability
distribution ln1,2:
ln1,2(V1, V2) =
n∏
i=1
l1,2(V
(i)
1 , V
(i)
2 ), (33)
where Vi = [V
(1)
i , . . . , V
(n)
i ], i = 1, 2. Namely:
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• Mechanism Q1 is 1-private and optimal.
• Mechanism Q2 is the optimal 2-private mechanism.
• Mechanism (Q1, Q2) is 2-private.
Proof. Let [x(1), . . . , x(n)] denote the coordinates of a vector x ∈ Rn. The desired probability
distribution is defined by independently sampling each coordinate using Theorem 10. Let:
ln1,2(x, y) = g(x, y) =
n∏
i=1
l1,2(x
(i), y(i)), (34)
The probability distribution satisfies the required marginal distributions:∫
Rn
g(x, y)dny =
(1
2
)n
e−1‖x‖1 and
∫
Rn
g(x, y)dnx =
(2
2
)n
e−2‖y‖1
Moreover, it satisfies 2-privacy constraints:
‖∇u lnP(Q1u = z1 and Q2u = z2)‖∞
=
∥∥∇u ln ln1,2(z1 − u, z2 − u)∥∥∞
= max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ui ln ln1,2(z1 − u, z2 − u)
∣∣∣∣
= max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ui ln l1,2(z(i)1 − u(i), z(i)2 − u(i))
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
1≤i≤n
2 = 2,
where in the last line we used the fact that l1,2 is 2-private. This completes the proof.
3.3 Multiple Privacy Relaxations
Theorems 10 and 11 perform privacy relaxation from 1 to 2. However, the privacy level is possibly
updated multiple times. Theorem 12 handles the case where the privacy level is successively relaxed
from 1 to 2, to 3, until m. Specifically, Theorem 12 enables the use of Theorem 10 multiple
times while relaxing privacy level from i to i+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. We call this statement the
Markov property of the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 12. Consider m privacy levels {i}mi=1 with 0 < 1 < · · · < m and mechanisms Qi of
the form:
Qiu = u+ Vi, with (V1, . . . , Vm) ∼ g ∈ ∆ (Rm) . (35)
Consider the distribution g = l1,...,m, with:
l1,...,m(v1, . . . , vm) = l1(v1)
m−1∏
i=1
li,i+1(vi, vi+1)
li(vi)
, (36)
where l(v) =

2e
−|v|. Then, distribution l1,...,m has the following properties:
1. Each prefix mechanism (Q1, . . . , Qi) is i-private, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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2. Each mechanism Qi is the optimal i-private mechanism, i.e. it minimizes the mean-squared
error EV 2i .
Proof. The proof uses induction on m. The case m = 2 is handled by Theorem 10. For brevity,
we prove the statement for m = 3. Let f(x, y) = l1,2(x, y) and g(y, z) = l2,3(y, z). Consider the
joint probability l1,2,3 :
h(x, y, z) = l1,2,3(x, y, z) =
f(x, y)g(y, z)
l2(y)
, (37)
where l2(y) =
2
2 e
−2|y|. Measure h possesses all the properties that perform gradual release of
private data:
• All marginal distributions of measure h are Laplace with parameters 11 , 12 , and 13 , respec-
tively:∫
R
∫
R
h(x, y, z)dydz = l1(x),
∫
R
∫
R
h(x, y, z)dxdz = l2(y), and
∫
R
∫
R
h(x, y, z)dxdy = l3(z).
• Mechanism Q1 is 1-private since V1 is Laplace-distributed with parameter 11 .
• Mechanism (Q1, Q2) is 2-private. Margining out V3 shows that (V1, V2) ∼ l1,2 , which
guarantees 2-privacy according to Theorem 10.
• Mechanism (Q1, Q2, Q3) is 3-private. It holds that:∣∣∣∣ ∂∂uP(Q1u = ψ1, Q2u = ψ2, and Q3u = ψ3)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂uh(ψ1 − u, ψ2 − u, ψ3 − u)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∂h(x, y, z)∂x + ∂h(x, y, z)∂y + ∂h(x, y, z)∂z
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣x=ψ1−u,
y=ψ2−u,
z=ψ3−u
(38)
Algebraic manipulation of the last expression establishes the result:∣∣∣∣∂h∂x + ∂h∂y + ∂h∂z
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣fxgl2 + fygl2 + fgyl2 − l2 fgl22 + fgzl2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣−sgn(y)2 fgl2 − sgn(z)3 fgl2 + sgn(y)2 fgl2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣−sgn(z)3 fgl2
∣∣∣∣
= 3h,
(39)
where we used the properties l′2 = −sgn(y)2l2 , fx + fy = −sgn(y)2f , and gy + gz = −sgn(z)3g,
where the last two identities were derived in the proof of Theorem 10.
Additionally, performing multiple rounds of privacy relaxations can be performed in the context
of Theorem 11 is possible. In that case, Theorem 12 is independently applied to each component.
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Figure 4: Privacy level can be repeatedly relaxed. For each round of relaxation i → i+1, the distribution
of the next noise sample Vi+1 depends only on the last noise sample Vi. Past noise samples {Vj}j<i can
be discarded from memory, thus, there is no complexity incurred from repeatedly relaxing privacy level.
3.3.1 Multiple Rounds of Privacy Relaxation
Theorem 12 states that it is possible to repeatedly use Theorem 10 to perform multiple privacy
level relaxations. An intuitive proof of Theorem 12 can be constructed by considering Scenarios 1
and 2 introduced in the beginning of Section 3. Specifically, Theorem 10 constructs a coupling such
that Scenario 1 replicates Scenario 2. Therefore, once the first round of privacy relaxation 1 → 2
occurs, the two scenarios are indistinguishable. The second round of privacy relaxation 2 → 3 is
performed by starting at the first step of Scenario 1.
In practice, Theorem 12 allows for an efficient implementation of an arbitrary number or privacy
relaxation rounds 1 → 2 → . . . → m. In particular, only the most recent privacy level i and
noise sample Vi need to be stored in memory. Sampling for Vi+1 depends only on current privacy
level i, current noise sample Vi and next privacy level i+1. Past privacy levels {j}j<i, past noise
samples {Vj}j<i, and future privacy levels {j}j>i+1 are not needed.
3.4 A Private Stochastic Process
Theorems 10 and 12 offer a novel dimension to the Laplace mechanism. Specifically, these results
establish a real-valued stochastic process {V :  > 0}. Sampling from the process {V}>0 performs
gradual release of sensitive data for the continuum of privacy levels (0,∞). Consider the mechanisms
Q that respond with Qu = y = u+ V. Then:
• V is optimally distributed, i.e. Laplace-distributed with parameter 1
• Any -truncated response {yσ}σ∈(0,] is -private.
Samples of the process {V}>0 are plotted in Figure 1. This process features properties that
allow efficient sampling:
• It is Markov, Vs⊥Vt|Vq, for s < q < t. Thus, a sample of the process V over an interval [1, 2]
can be extended to [1, 3], for 3 > 2.
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• It is lazy, i.e. V+δ = V with high probability, for δ  1. Therefore, A sample of the process
{V}1≤≤2 can be efficiently stored; only a finite (random) number m of points (i, Vi)mi=1
where jumps occur need to be stored for exact re-construction of the process.
4 Applications
4.1 Crowdsourcing Statistics with RAPPOR
Theorems 10 and 12 perform gradual release of private data by releasing responses that approximate
the identity query q(u) = u. In practice, however, the end-user of private data is interested in more
expressive queries q. The spectrum of such queries vastly varies. Examples include the mean value
1
n
∑n
i=1 ui of a collection of private data u1, . . . , un, and solutions to optimization problems [8].
Our results are directly applicable to a broad family of queries which are approximated by private
mechanisms built around the Laplace mechanism. Specifically, consider mechanisms based on the
Laplace mechanism and have the form shown in Figure 5. The database of private data is initially
preprocessed and, then, additive Laplace-distributed noise is used. The result is post-processed in
order to maximize the accuracy of the response. Informally stated:
Corollary 13. Let (U , d) be a metric space of sensitive data, Y be a set of responses, and  > 0 be
a privacy level. Let
• F : U → ∆ (Rn) be a preprocessing step with sensitivity β that is invariant of ,
• L : Rn → ∆ (Rn) be the Laplace mechanism with parameter :
Lu = u+ V, where V ∼ e−

β
‖V ‖1 , (40)
• G : Rn → ∆ (Y) be a post-processing step.
Consider the -private mechanism
G ◦ L ◦ F : U → ∆ (Y) . (41)
Then, there exists a composite mechanism that performs gradual release of sensitive data u ∈ U .
Thus, our results are directly applicable to a existing privacy-aware mechanisms in e.g. smart
grids [19], [2], and user’s reports [2]. On the other hand, applying our results is not yet possible
for mechanisms that do not fulfill this assumption, such as privately solving optimization problems
with stochastic gradient descent [8].
In particular, Google’s RAPPOR [2] is a mechanism that collects private data from multiple
users for “crowdsourcing statistics” and can be expressed in terms of the Laplace mechanism. RAP-
POR collects personal information from users such as the software features they use and the URLs
they visited, and provides statistics of this information over a population of users. Algorithmically,
a Bloom filter B is applied of size k is applied to each user’s private data u:
B : U → {0, 1}k, y = [y1, . . . , yk] = B(u), (42)
where U is the space of private data, in particular, the set of all strings. Next, each bit yi is
perturbed with probability f and the result is memoised:
f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k, z = [z1, . . . , zk] = f(y), where zi =

0, w.p. 12α,
1, w.p. 12α,
yi, w.p. 1− c1,
(43)
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Figure 5: User 1 wants to share his sensitive data, such as his date of birth, in the a social network.
Although, user 1 has no privacy concerns when sharing this information with his close friends 2 and 3,
he has gradually increasing privacy issues for other members of the network. Specifically, a group A of
distant users should not be able to collude and extract more information than what it is intended.
where “w.p.” stands for “with probability” and α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. Finally, RAPPOR
applies another perturbation each time a report is communicated to the server. This perturbation
is equivalent to the map (43) but differently parametrized:
g : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k, w = [w1, . . . , wk] = f(z), where P(wi = 1) =
{
β, if zi = 1,
γ, if zi = 0,
(44)
where β, γ ∈ [0, 1] are parameters. RAPPOR’s differential privacy guarantees relax (increased )
for small values of α and γ, and large values of β.
An important limitation of RAPPOR is that parameters α, β, and γ are forever fixed. However,
there are reasons that require the ability to update these values in a way that the privacy is relaxed
and the accuracy is increased:
• Due to the non-trivial algorithm of decoding the reports, a tight accuracy-analysis is not
possible. Instead, the accuracy of the system is evaluated once the system is bootstrapped.1
Our results makes it possible to initialize the parameters with tight values α → 1, β → .5,
γ → .5, and subsequently relax the parameters until a desired accuracy is achieved.
• Once a process or URL is suspected as malicious, the server would be interested in relaxing
the privacy level and performing more accurate analysis of the potential threat. Once such
a threat is identified, our result allows users to gradually relax their privacy parameters and
the server can more confidently explore the potential threat.
In order to apply Theorems 10 and 12 to RAPPOR, we express the randomized maps (43) and
(44) using the Laplace mechanism. Specifically, consider the functions f¯ and g¯ that add Laplace
noise and project the result to {0, 1}:
f¯(ψ) =
[
ψ + Vf >
1
2
]
, where Vf ∼ Lap
(
1
−2 lnα
)
, (45)
g¯(ζ) =
[
ζ + Vg >
ln(2γ)
ln (4γ(1− β))
]
, where Vg ∼ Lap
(
1
− ln (4β(1− γ))
)
, (46)
1Even in that case, estimating the actual accuracy can be challenging since it should be performed in a differential
private way.
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where ψ, ζ ∈ {0, 1}, Lap(b) is the Laplace distribution with parameter b, and [expr] ∈ {0, 1} is 1
if, and only if, expr is true. Note that functions f¯ and g¯ have the structure of Figure 5. Moreover,
it can be shown that f¯ and g¯ applied component-wise to y and z are reformulations of the maps
f and g. Therefore, privacy level relaxation is achieved by sampling noises Vf and Vg as suggested
by our results.
4.2 Privacy in Social Networks
The context of social networks provides another setting where gradually releasing private data is
critical. Consider a social network as a graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of users and E the set
of friendships between them. Each user owns a set of sensitive data that can include the date of
birth, the number of friends and the city he currently resides. In the realm of social media, user’s
privacy concerns scale with the distance to other users of the network. Specifically, an individual is
willing to share his private data with his close friends without any privacy guarantees, is skeptical
about sharing this information with friends of his friends, and is alarmed to release his sensitive
data over the entire social network. Therefore, an individual i chooses a different privacy level j
for each user j ∈ V as a decreasing function between users i and j:
j =
1
d(i, j)
, (47)
where d is a distance measure, e.g. the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j. Then,
user i could generate an j-private response yj independently for each member j of the network.
However, more private information than desired is leaked. Specifically, consider the part of the
social network shown in Figure 6, where user i = 1 wishes to share his sensitive data u, such as her
date of birth. Then, consider a group A ⊆ V of users residing far away from user 1 such that the
privacy budget j allocated by user i to each member j of the group A is small:
d(1, j) 1⇒ j  1.
In the case that members of the large group A decide to collude, they can infer more information
about the sensitive data u. Specifically, if a large group A averages the received responses {yj :
j ∈ A}, the exact value of sensitive data u is recovered. Indeed, composition theorem implies that
only
(∑
j∈A j
)
-privacy of sensitive data u is guaranteed. For a large group A, this privacy level
becomes very loose.
Our approach mitigates this issue. We assume that noisy versions of the private data are
correlated and we design a mechanism that retains strong privacy guarantees. For real-valued
sensitive data u, user 1 samples {v :  > 0} from the stochastic process {V :  > 0}, and responds
to user j with yj = u+vj , as shown in Figure 7. In the case that a large group A of users colludes,
they are unable to extract much more information. Specifically, such a collusion renders individual’s
sensitive information at most (maxj∈A j)-differential private. This privacy budget is significantly
tighter than the one derived in the naive application of differential privacy and corresponds to the
best information that a member of the group A has. After all, if a close friend leaks sensitive
information, it is impossible to revoke it.
5 Open Problems
Finally, we conjecture that gradually releasing private data can be extended to any query and is,
therefore, an intrinsic property of differential privacy. This conjecture is a key ingredient for the
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Figure 6: User 1 wants to share his sensitive data, such as his date of birth, in the a social network.
Although, user 1 has no privacy concerns when sharing this information with his close friends 2 and 3,
he has gradually increasing privacy issues for other members of the network. Specifically, a group A of
distant users should not be able to collude and extract more information than what it is intended.
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Figure 7: User 1 draws a single sample from the stochastic process {V}>0 and responds to user i with
yi = u + Vi , where i is the privacy level against user i. Eventually, having access to more responses
{yi}i∈A does not reveal more information about private data u than the best response max∈A i.
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existence of a frictionless market of private data. In such a market, owners of private data can grad-
ually agree to a rational choice of privacy level. Moreover, buying the exact private data is expected
to be extremely costly. Instead, people may choose to buy private data in “chunks”, in the sense
of increasing privacy budgets. We conjecture that gradually releasing sensitive data without loss
in accuracy is feasible for a broader family of privacy-preserving mechanisms beyond mechanisms
that approximate identity queries. This work was focused mechanisms which are defined on real
space or sensitive data U = Rn under an `1-norm adjacency relation, and approximate the identity
query.
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